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PORTER V. STATE: APPROPRIATELY PUSHING THE LIMITS OF THE 
BATTERED SPOUSE SYNDROME STATUTE 
 
Joy Dodge* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In Porter v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals determined 
whether a woman who employed a hit man to kill her abusive husband 
could use the Battered Spouse Syndrome statute to justify a jury 
instruction on imperfect self-defense.1 The court held that a woman who  
produced evidence that she suffered from Battered Spouse Syndrome 
was entitled to an imperfect self-defense jury instruction, even though 
she hired a man to kill her husband.2 The court reached the correct 
conclusion in this case because it not only recognized the realities of 
Battered Spouse Syndrome, but it also aligned with the self-defense 
law’s low threshold for raising jury issues.3 The court struck a delicate 
balance by avoiding overstepping or creating a new defense to murder 
and harmonizing the legislative history, precedent, and self-defense law 
into a coherent whole.4 This case note will begin by describing the facts 
of the case in Part I,5 followed by a discussion of legal history in Part 
II,6 the Maryland Court of Appeals’ analysis in Part III,7 and an analysis 
of the court’s decision in relation to precedent and social science 
research in Part IV.8 
 
I. THE CASE 
 
Karla Louise Porter, the petitioner-defendant in this case, was a 
long-time sufferer of domestic violence.9 Ms. Porter testified during her 
trial that her husband, William Raymond Porter, had inflicted the 
following injuries on her:  
 
                                                 
 2018 Joy Dodge 
* J.D. Candidate – May 2019 
1 Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017). 
2 Id. at 1061. 
3 See infra Part IV. 
4 Id. 
5 See infra Part I. 
6 See infra Part II. 
7 See infra Part III. 
8 See infra Part IV. 
9 Porter v. State, 148 A.3d 1, 4–5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 
166 A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017). 
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[Mr. Porter had] beaten her on her back and legs with a belt; on 
various occasions hit her with a rake, a board, his fists, and a 
tool box; stabbed her in the abdomen with a drill; pushed her 
head into a grave marker; smeared dog excrement on her; 
threatened to kill her on several occasions, at least once while 
pointing a gun at her[;] . . . and forced her to stand at their 
kitchen sink and drink water until she urinated on herself.”10  
 
Moreover, about a week before her husband passed away, Ms. Porter’s 
husband allegedly “held a gun to Ms. Porter’s head . . . [and said] ‘I 
should just kill you now.’”11 Also within the week of his death, Mr. 
Porter hit Ms. Porter across her back with a crutch when she failed to 
sympathize with his boredom.12 Throughout her marriage, which began 
in 1986, Ms. Porter suffered abuse at the hands of her husband.13 Ms. 
Porter testified at trial that she “knew it was a matter of time before he 
killed [her].”14 
 
 From June 2009 to January 2010, Ms. Porter tried 
unsuccessfully to solicit someone to kill her husband for her.15 
Eventually, Ms. Porter’s nephew introduced her to Walter Bishop, who 
volunteered to kill her husband after hearing about the abuse she 
endured.16 The evening before her husband’s death, Ms. Porter called 
Mr. Bishop.17 Mr. Bishop agreed to shoot Mr. Porter at the gas station 
that the Porter’s owned the following morning.18 On March 1, 2010, Mr. 
Bishop shot Mr. Porter and staged the incident to look like a robbery.19 
Ms. Porter was arrested on March 6, after one of the previous people 
                                                 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 5. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 4. 
14 Porter v. State, 148 A.3d 1, 5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 166 
A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017). 
15 Id. at 6 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 6–7. Ms. Porter called Mr. Bishop and her brother, who was driving Bishop 
to the gas station, over fifty times before the shooting. 
19 Porter v. State, 148 A.3d 1, 7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 166 
A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017). 
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she solicited to kill her husband called the police.20 Ms. Porter 
eventually confessed that she hired Mr. Bishop to beat up her husband.21 
 
 At trial, Dr. Neal Blumberg, an expert witness, testified that in 
the year before her husband’s death, Ms. Porter “became increasingly 
anxious and fearful for her life and safety,” “felt . . . helpless to extricate 
herself,” and suffered from Battered Spouse Syndrome,22 as defined in 
Section 10–916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article.23 
 
 The jury received instruction on imperfect self-defense. The jury 
was, in part, told that  
 
[i]f the Defendant actually believed that she was in immediate 
danger of death or serious bodily harm, even though a 
reasonable person would not have so believed, and the 
Defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to 
defend herself in light of  the threatened or actual force, and that 
retreat from the threat was unsafe, and that she was not the 
aggressor, the Defendant’s actual, though unreasonable belief, 
is a partial self-defense and the verdict should be guilty of 
voluntary manslaughter rather than murder.24  
 
The jury found Ms. Porter guilty of “murder in the first degree, use of 
a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, conspiracy to 
                                                 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 7.  
22 Id. at 8–9. 
23 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916(b) (West 2018) (“Notwithstanding 
evidence that the defendant was the first aggressor, used excessive force, or failed to 
retreat at the time of the alleged offense, when the defendant raises the issue that the 
defendant was, at the time of the alleged offense, suffering from the Battered Spouse 
Syndrome as a result of the past course of conduct of the individual who is the 
victim of the crime for which the defendant has been charged, the court may admit 
for the purpose of explaining the defendant's motive or state of mind, or both, at the 
time of the commission of the alleged offense: (1) Evidence of repeated physical and 
psychological abuse of the defendant perpetrated by an individual who is the victim 
of a crime for which the defendant has been charged; and (2) Expert testimony on 
the Battered Spouse Syndrome.”). 
24 Porter v. State, 148 A.3d 1, 17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 
166 A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017). 
Dodge  
238  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 18:1 
 
commit murder in the first degree, and three counts of solicitation to 
commit murder.”25 
 
 On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that, 
although the jury instruction had erroneously stated that retreat had to 
be unsafe and the defendant could not have been the aggressor to find 
imperfect self-defense, the court nevertheless found that this was a 
harmless error, since Ms. Porter was not eligible for the imperfect self-
defense instruction.26 The court noted that, in order to be entitled to an 
imperfect self-defense instruction, the defendant must have “honestly, 
albeit subjectively, believed that she was in imminent, that is to say, 
immediate, danger of death or serious bodily harm.”27 Moreover, 
Battered Spouse Syndrome can be used to “‘support both the subjective 
honesty of the defendant’s perception of imminent harm and the 
objective reasonableness of such a perception.’”28 The court reasoned 
that, although there was evidence of imminent fear in the weeks prior to 
Mr. Porter’s death, there was a lack of evidence of Ms. Porter’s fear of 
imminent danger “at the time that Mr. Porter was shot[; thus,] there was 
insufficient evidence to generate a jury instruction on self-defense.”29  
 
 Judge Friedman dissented.30 Judge Friedman pointed out that 
the “some evidence”31 standard to raise a jury issue can be satisfied even 
with the introduction of only “the uncorroborated testimony of the 
defendant.”32 Moreover, Judge Friedman cited Wright v. State,33 which 
stated that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction even if the defense 
is “well-nigh incredible as a matter of fact.”34 Judge Friedman also 
argued that the question of imminence is not for the judge to decide.35 
                                                 
25 Id. at 11. 
26 Id. at 24. 
27 Id. (citing State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759, 761 (Md. 1984)). 
28 Id. at 22 (quoting State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429, 439 (Md. 2004)). 
29 Porter v. State, 148 A.3d 1, 24 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 
166 A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017).  
30 Id. at 24. 
31 Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017). 
32 Id. at 34 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (citing Arthur v. State, 24 A.3d 667, 675 (Md. 
2011)). 
33 Id. (citing Wright v. State, 522 A.2d 401 (Md. 1987)). 
34 Wright, 522 A.2d at 402 (citing Howell v. State, 468 A.2d 688, 691 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1983)). 
35 Porter, 148 A.3d at 35 (citing State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429 (Md. 2004)). 
Dodge 
2018]   PORTER V. STATE 239 
 
Thus, Judge Friedman believed that Ms. Porter established a pattern of 
abuse and should be entitled to a self-defense jury instruction.36 Lastly, 
Judge Friedman argued that the use of a contract killer is not relevant, 
in the absence of the statute specifically stating that its scope is limited 
to certain types of homicides.37 
 
The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari on the question 
of whether the trial court’s erroneous instruction on imperfect self-
defense constitutes harmless error.38 
 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
  
 A. Self-Defense in General 
  
State v. Faulkner39 set forth the difference between perfect self-
defense and imperfect self-defense in Maryland:  
 
Perfect self-defense requires not only that the killer subjectively 
believed that his actions were necessary for his safety but, 
objectively, that a reasonable man would so consider them. 
Imperfect self-defense, however, requires no more than a 
subjective honest belief on the part of the killer that his actions 
were necessary for his safety, even though, on an objective 
appraisal by a reasonable man, they would not be found to be 
so. If established, the killer remains culpable and his actions are 
excused only to the extent that mitigation is invoked.40 
 
A claim of imperfect self-defense negates malice, the mens rea element 
of murder.41 Imperfect self-defense is not a complete defense; rather, a 
successful claim merely mitigates a murder charge to manslaughter.42 
When a defendant presents evidence of a subjective belief that the force 
used was necessary to prevent imminent danger, the court noted that 
                                                 
36 Id. at 34. 
37 Id. at 36. 
38 Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017). 
39 State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759 (Md. 1984). 
40 Id. at 768–69 (quoting Faulkner v. State, 458 A.2d 81, 82 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1983)). 
41 Id. at 761. 
42 Id. 
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“the defendant is entitled to a proper instruction on imperfect self-
defense.”43 
 
 State v. Marr reaffirmed State v. Faulkner’s explanation of self-
defense.44 Marr noted that imperfect self-defense involves the 
defendant actually believing that she is in “apparent imminent danger 
of death or serious bodily harm from the assailant, requiring the use of 
deadly force,” but does not require an objectively reasonable belief.45 
What the defendant unreasonably, but actually believes may be “the 
perception of imminent danger or the belief that the force employed is 
necessary to meet the danger.”46  A defendant whose acts meet this 
definition of imperfect self-defense “does not act with malice” and thus 
cannot be guilty of murder, but rather manslaughter.47 
 
 Wilson v. State further clarified the requirements for asserting 
imperfect self-defense in Maryland.48 The court quoted Dykes v. State 
and made clear that the defendant need only produce “some evidence” 
on the issue of self-defense to create a jury issue.49  “Some evidence” 
need not rise to a preponderance of the evidence standard.50 Moreover, 
“[t]he source of the evidence is immaterial; it may emanate solely from 
the defendant” and may be “overwhelmed by evidence to the 
contrary.”51 The court made clear that “[i]f there is any evidence relied 
on by the defendant which, if believed would support his claim that he 
acted in self-defense, the defendant has met his burden.”52 The court 
emphasized that it was up to the jury to evaluate the defendant’s 
trustworthiness, and that it was not appropriate for the court to weigh 
the veracity of the defendant’s statements, even when the defendant’s 
statements were “overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary.”53 
 
                                                 
43 Id. at 769. 
44 State v. Marr, 765 A.2d 645 (Md. 2001). 
45 Id. at 648. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Wilson v. State, 30 A.3d 955 (Md. 2011). 
49 Id. at 960 (quoting Dykes v. State, 571 A.2d 1251, 1256 (Md. 1990)).   
50 Id. (quoting Dykes, 571 A.2d at 1257). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Wilson, 30 A.3d at 960. 
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 B. Battered Spouse Syndrome 
 
Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article sets forth the Battered Spouse or Battered Woman’s Syndrome 
Statute, which was signed into law in 1991.54 In part, Section 10-916 of 
the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states that: 
 
Notwithstanding evidence that the defendant was the first 
aggressor, used excessive force, or failed to retreat at the time of 
the alleged offense, when the defendant raises the issue that the 
defendant was, at the time of the alleged offense, suffering from 
the Battered Spouse Syndrome as a result of the past course of 
conduct of the individual who is the victim of the crime for 
which the defendant has been charged, the court may admit for 
the purpose of explaining the defendant’s motive or state of 
mind, or both, at the time of the commission of the alleged 
offense: (1) Evidence of repeated physical and psychological 
abuse of the defendant perpetrated by an individual who is the 
victim of a crime for which the defendant has been charged; and 
(2) Expert testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome.55 
 
 The Senate Judicial Proceedings Floor Report on House Bill 49, 
which became Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article stated, after a discussion of the difference between 
perfect and imperfect self-defense, that “[t]his bill would clarify that the 
court has discretion to admit evidence of repeated physical and 
psychological abuse of the defendant by the alleged victim and expert 
testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome.”56 The Floor Report also 
articulated the appropriate standard that the legislature foresaw being 
used under this statute.57 It made clear that Section 10-916 of the 
Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article was originally 
intended to be discretionary. 
 
                                                 
54 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10–916 (West 2018). 
55 Id. 
56 S. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMM., FLOOR REP. H.B. 49, 401st Sess., at 2 (Md. 
1991). 
57 Id. 
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 Included in the bill file for House Bill 49 is a letter from House 
of Ruth Attorney Judith A. Wolfer.58 She stated that “[e]xpert testimony 
is crucial to help explain how a battered spouse becomes an expert in 
anticipating her partner’s abuse, why she was unable to leave the 
battering situation, why she perceived herself to be in imminent harm 
that moment, and why her action appeared to be the only viable choice 
left to her.”59  Moreover, Wolfer dispelled several myths about the law, 
including: that the bill requires the court to admit evidence in every case, 
that this is a license to kill, that Battered Spouse Syndrome is not 
commonly accepted in the medical and legal community, and that 
Battered Spouse Syndrome will become a new defense to murder.60 The 
letter also made clear that this “bill only ensures a fair trial, not an 
acquittal.”61 
 
 Banks v. State62 is a case about hearsay, but it was the first case 
to comment on Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article. Banks v. State provided that Section 10-916 of the 
Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is not a new defense 
to murder.63 Rather, Battered Spouse Syndrome “is offered to prove the 
honesty and reasonableness of the defendant's belief that he or she was 
in imminent danger at the time of the offense.”64 
 
 In State v. Smullen, the Maryland Court of Appeals shed light 
on the Battered Spouse Syndrome statute.65 The court reasoned that 
                                                 
58 Letter from Judith A. Wolfer, House of Ruth, to House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 27, 
1991) (on file with the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law 
Thurgood Marshall Law Library). The House of Ruth is an organization founded in 
1977 to provide a safe haven for victims of domestic violence and their children. 
About House of Ruth, HOUSE OF RUTH MD., http://www.hruth.org/about-us/ (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2018).  
59 Letter from Judith A. Wolfer, House of Ruth, to House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 27, 
1991) (on file with the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law 
Thurgood Marshall Law Library). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 608 A.2d 1249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992). 
63 Id. at 1253. 
64 Id. 
65 844 A.2d 429, 449–51(Md. 2004) (holding that, although battered child syndrome 
is within the purview of Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial 
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evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome explains, “why and how, in light 
of that pattern of abuse, the defendant could honestly, and perhaps 
reasonably, perceive an imminent threat of immediate danger.”66 The 
statute provides for a “more careful and sophisticated look at the notion 
of imminent threat” and recognizes “that certain conduct that might not 
be regarded as imminently dangerous by the public at large can cause 
someone who has been repeatedly subjected to and hurt by that conduct 
before to honestly, even if unreasonably, regard it as imminently 
threatening.”67 The court explained in a footnote that Section 10-916 of 
the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is not in actuality 
discretionary: 
 
[i]f, because an adequate foundation for it has been established, 
syndrome evidence is relevant and is properly offered, the court 
must admit it, first, because Maryland Rule 5-402 makes clear 
that, unless rendered admissible by other law, all relevant 
evidence is admissible, and second, because a defendant has a 
Due Process Constitutional right to . . . have considered relevant 
and admissible evidence in support of . . . [her] defense.68 
 
The court cautioned, however, that Battered Spouse Syndrome is not 
intended to become an independent defense to murder.69 For example, 
the defendant in State v. Smullen was not entitled to a jury instruction 
on imperfect self-defense because he only testified to unclear events of 
abuse that did not cause serious injury or attract the notice of third 
parties.70 Absent the defendant providing an evidentiary basis to support 
a claim of imperfect self-defense, the court cautioned that Section 10-
916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article would 
become an independent defense to murder.71 
 
 In State v. Peterson, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
reviewed a case where the trial court declined an imperfect self-defense 
                                                 
Proceedings Article, Mr. Smullen did not present evidence of repeated physical 
abuse sufficient to be entitled to an imperfect self-defense jury instruction). 
66 Id. at 453. 
67 Id. at 439. 
68 Id. at 445 n.8. 
69 Id. at 439. 
70 Smullen, 844 A.2d at 453. 
71 Id. 
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jury instruction in a case of non-confrontational homicide.72 Although 
an expert witness testified that the victim in the case believed that she 
was in imminent danger when she shot her husband, the expert witness 
was not asked about Battered Spouse Syndrome in particular.73 The 
court held that there was sufficient evidence of abuse, including 
corroboration from the victim’s son, such that the victim should have 
been afforded expert testimony on Battered Spouse Syndrome.74 The 
court held that the failure to introduce evidence of Battered Spouse 
Syndrome was ineffective assistance of counsel because “[i]t is 
reasonably probable” that had the evidence been introduced, “the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.”75 
 
C. Third-Party Assisted Homicide and Battered Spouse 
Syndrome in Other Jurisdictions 
 
No Maryland court prior to Porter has dealt with the interplay 
between self-defense law and contract killings in the context of 
domestic violence.76 However, other jurisdictions have addressed this 
issue. In People v. Yaklich,77 the Colorado Court of Appeals held “that 
a self-defense instruction is not available in a contract-for-hire situation, 
even though the accused presents credible evidence that she is a victim 
of the battered woman syndrome.”78 The court rested its decision on the 
fact that, in Colorado, Battered Spouse Syndrome is not a defense to 
murder, rather, it can merely be considered in the self-defense context.79 
The defendant in this case could not prove imminent danger to be 
entitled to a self-defense jury instruction.80 The court decided that 
allowing Battered Spouse Syndrome to become a defense to murder in 
contract killings would undermine self-defense law and contravene 
                                                 
72 State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). 
73 Id. In addition to being physically abused, Ms. Peterson’s husband made clear that 
his threats to kill her were “promises.” Id. at 1137. 
74 Id. at 1151–52. 
75 Id. at 1154. 
76 Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044, 1062 (Md. 2017) (“We acknowledge that three 
other jurisdictions faced with this question have declined to allow a self-defense jury 
instruction when a woman hires a third party to kill her abusive partner.”). 
77 833 P.2d 758 (Colo. 1991). 
78 Id. at 760. 
79 Id. at 761. 
80 Id. at 763 (noting that the defendant planned her husband’s death over an eight-
month period). 
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public policy to allow the defendant to escape punishment while letting 
the hired killer face a murder conviction.81 
 
 The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee at Nashville in 
State v. Leaphart82 held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury 
instruction on self-defense, where she could not prove imminent fear at 
the time of the killing.83 Tennessee law defines imminent fear as fear 
“at the time of the killing” and the defendant could not meet this 
threshold.84 
 
 In State v. Anderson,85 the Missouri Court of Appeals held that 
the trial court properly excluded evidence that the defendant suffered 
from Battered Spouse Syndrome. Missouri has a statute dealing with 
Battered Spouse Syndrome,86 but the statute requires that self-defense 
already be independently established in the case before admitting 
evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome.87 The defendant in this case 
could not establish imminent fear, where she planned her husband’s 
homicide for three months; thus, she was not entitled to a self-defense 
jury instruction.88 
 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
 
The Maryland Court of Appeals began its analysis in the Porter case                          
by discussing the law of self-defense.89 Judge Adkins, writing for the 
majority, noted that, according to State v. Smullen, imperfect self-
defense merely requires a showing that the defendant actually believed 
she was in danger, no matter whether or not the belief was reasonable.90 
Moreover, the court explained that the defendant need only show that 
                                                 
81 Id. 
82 673 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). 
83 Id. at 873. 
84 Id. (quoting State v. Wilson, 556 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tenn. 1977)). 
85 785 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
86 MO. REV. STAT. § 563.033 (2017)). 
87 Anderson, 785 S.W.2d at 600. 
88 Id. 
89 Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044, 1053 (Md. 2017). 
90 Id. (citing State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429, 439 (Md. 2004)). 
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she actually believed that retreat was unsafe and the “force used was 
necessary.”91  
 
 The court then engaged in an extensive discussion of Battered 
Spouse Syndrome.92 It explained that domestic violence is pervasive 
and that nearly half of murdered women were killed by an intimate 
partner.93  The court quoted Dr. Lenore Walker’s findings that 
“[b]attered spouse syndrome is characterized by two main phenomena: 
a cycle of intimate partner violence and the development of ‘learned 
helplessness.’”94 The court then connected Battered Spouse Syndrome 
to imperfect self-defense.95 Specifically, the court stated that the 
testimony of experts as to how Battered Spouse Syndrome influences a 
woman’s decision to use force against her abuser is vital for self-defense 
claims.96 The expert testimony can explain both why the woman did not 
leave her abuser and how seemingly innocuous events could be 
perceived as threatening to a woman undergoing repeated cycles of 
abuse.97 
 
 The opinion then returned to a discussion of self-defense in 
general.98 To be entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense, the 
defendant need only produce “‘some evidence.’”99 Moreover, the court, 
after examining cases from other states, clarified that the defendant need 
only show that she feared imminent or immediate death or serious 
bodily harm, “not both.”100 The court noted that, in order to avoid 
redundancy in the definition of imperfect self-defense, the two words 
                                                 
91 Porter, 166 A.3d at 1053 (citations omitted). 
92 Id. at 1054–55. The Court noted that the majority of the victims of intimate partner 
violence are women and that about one in four women will experience intimate 
partner violence at some point. Id. at 1054. 
93 Id. (citing BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 236018, HOMICIDE 
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1980–2008, at 18 (2011), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf). 
94 Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044, 1054 (Md. 2017) (quoting Lenore E. A. Walker, 
Battered Women Syndrome and Self–Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 321, 330 (1992)). 
95 Id. at 1054–55. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. (citing State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429, 451 (Md. 2004)). 
98 Id. at 1055–56. 
99 Porter, 166 A.3d at 1056 (quoting Wilson v. State, 30 A.3d, 955, 960 (Md. 2011)). 
100 Id. at 1059. 
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cannot be defined synonymously.101 The court made clear that “an 
imminent threat is not dependent on its temporal proximity to the 
defensive act.”102  
 
 Furthermore, connecting self-defense to Battered Spouse 
Syndrome, the court opined that “[i]f we were to hold that a battered 
spouse who kills in a non-confrontational setting is not entitled to a self-
defense instruction, we would render all or some of the evidence 
admissible under the Battered Spouse Syndrome statute irrelevant.”103 
Moreover, absent a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense, entering 
evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome “would be pointless.”104 
Entering evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome is imperative to 
preserving a claim of imperfect self-defense.105 In the case of non-
confrontational homicides, providing expert testimony about how an 
abused “woman might actually fear imminent danger during a break 
between violent episodes” can help a jury understand the situation.106 
The court not only pointed out that Ms. Porter presented evidence that 
she feared imminent danger, but also noted that “[i]n a cyclical, abusive 
relationship the threatened violence will come to fruition – it is often 
only a matter of when.”107 
 
 The Maryland Court of Appeals allowed Ms. Porter to claim 
imperfect self-defense, holding that a woman who suffers from Battered 
Spouse Syndrome need not be abused within “hours of her defensive 
action to be entitled to an instruction on imperfect self-defense.”108 
Acknowledging that extending the definition of imminence recognizes 
“the reality of intimate partner violence,” the court also noted that 
                                                 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Porter, 166 A.3d at 1059. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. Research indicates that, in the case of non-confrontational homicides, during 
the cycle of violence, a woman’s fear of being “unable to defend herself when the 
next attack comes” builds and so she “finally ‘defends’ herself at her only 
opportunity [] during a lull in the violence.’” Id. (quoting David L. Faigman and 
Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 67, 73 (1997) (footnotes omitted)). 
107 Id. at 1061. 
108 Id. 
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“[i]mperfect self-defense negates the element of malice, not 
premeditation.”109 The court highlighted that “[t]he means by which a 
woman takes defensive action against her abuser does not affect 
whether she actually believed she was in imminent danger at the time 
of the killing.”110 Thus, even a woman who hired a hit man can claim 
imperfect-self-defense.111 The court acknowledged that its decision was 
not in line with holdings from three other jurisdictions that have 
addressed  this question, but pointed out that none of the other states 
had a statute that allowed evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome to 
support a claim of imperfect self-defense.112 Moreover, Missouri, the 
only state with a battered spouse statute that addressed this question, 
only allowed its use in cases of perfect self-defense, rather than 
imperfect self-defense.113 The opinion also boldly stated that contract 
killings should not be treated differently from other non-confrontational 
killings, with or without a Battered Spouse Syndrome statute.114 
 
 Judge Greene dissented, arguing that planned killings cannot be 
in response to an imminent threat.115 The majority criticized Judge 
Greene’s dissent for showing a lack of understanding of the realities of 
domestic violence.116 Namely, the majority rebuked the notion that a 
threat must be contemporaneous with the defensive action for the victim 
to be entitled to a claim of imperfect self-defense.117 The majority 
opinion states that the dissent improperly conflates reasonable fear and 
actual fear.118 The court then explained that Ms. Porter satisfied the 
“some evidence” requirement for being entitled to an imperfect self-
defense jury instruction.119 The evidence that Ms. Porter feared 
                                                 
109 Porter, 166 A.3d at 1059 (citing State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759, 769 (1984)). 
110 Id. at 1062. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. (citing State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)). 
114 Porter, 166 A.3d at 1062. 
115 Id. at 1065 (Greene, J., dissenting). 
116 Id. at 1062 (majority opinion). 
117 Id. The Court noted that “only about half of nonfatal instances of intimate partner 
violence are reported to police, in part because women fear reprisal or believe the 
police will be unable to help them,” thus, the dissent’s opinion is out of touch with 
the reality of intimate partner violence by assuming women could leave instead of 
planning defensive action. 
118 Id. at 1063. 
119 Porter, 166 A.3d at 1063. 
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imminent danger on the day her husband was killed included Ms. 
Porter’s testimony that in the month before his death, Mr. Porter 
threatened to kill Ms. Porter while pointing a gun at her head and that 
Ms. Porter “knew he was going to kill [her] at any point.”120 Thus, 
despite using a third party to kill her husband, the court held that Ms. 
Porter was entitled to a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense.121 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
In Porter v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a 
woman who had produced evidence that she suffered from Battered 
Spouse Syndrome was entitled to an imperfect self-defense jury 
instruction even though she hired a man to kill her husband.122 The 
Maryland Court of Appeals made the correct decision in Porter. The 
court harmonized social science research, the legislative history of 
Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article, precedent, and self-defense law into a coherent whole, while 
avoiding creating a new defense to murder. Porter expanded the Section 
10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article 
precedent to allow Battered Spouse Syndrome evidence to be used to 
explain imminent fear in imperfect self-defense, even when the woman 
hired a hitman.123 Although the court went further than prior court 
decisions on Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article, the court’s reasoning is squarely in line with self-
defense precedent that calls for a low threshold for evidence required to 
generate a jury instruction.124 Allowing this defense in hired gun cases, 
although stretching the statute to the limit and exceeding legislative 
intent, recognizes the realities of Battered Spouse Syndrome, while still 
respecting stare decisis. The court’s decision remained within the 
                                                 
120 Id. 
121 Id. The Court finished its discussion of this case with a brief discussion of the 
crime of conspiracy, stating that the crime requires malicious intent to kill, which an 
imperfect self-defense claim negates. Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044, 1065 (2017). 
Thus, if the jury believed Ms. Porter’s imperfect self-defense claim, she could not be 
found guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. Id. 
122 Id. at 1065. 
123 Id. 
124 Wilson v. State, 30 A.3d 955, 960 (Md. 2011); Dykes v. State, 571 A.2d 1251, 
1256 (Md. 1990). 
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bounds of precedent, but expanded the doctrine to reflect societal 
realities, as many courts have done before.125 
 
 The language of Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Article and the Senate Floor Report on House Bill 
49 is unambiguous; the entry of Battered Spouse Syndrome evidence 
was originally designed to be discretionary.126 Moreover, Section 10-
916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article was never 
designed to be a new defense to murder.127 However, Section 10-916 of 
the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is a recognition 
that evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome is relevant to the issue of 
self-defense.128 Since Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Article makes clear that evidence related to 
Battered Spouse Syndrome is relevant, the reality is that judges do not 
actually have the discretion to admit this evidence. As the Court of 
Appeals in State v. Smullen noted and Porter v. State recognized in 
making its decision, Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article must be considered in concert with other Maryland 
law.129 The result is that the court must admit evidence of Battered 
Spouse Syndrome because the court is required to admit relevant 
evidence under Maryland Rule 5-402, minus a few well-defined 
exceptions.130 Moreover, since the evidence is relevant and must be 
admitted, once the evidence is presented, it follows that the jury must 
receive an instruction on the issue. Recognizing long-standing self-
defense law, the Maryland Court of Appeals correctly emphasized the 
fact that the defendant need only produce some evidence going to the 
issue of self-defense to be entitled to a self-defense jury instruction.131 
                                                 
125 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (deciding to overturn 
precedent while considering changes in society at large); see also Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing the right to privacy, although there 
was no explicit right to privacy in the Constitution). 
126 See supra Section II.B. 
127 See supra Section II.B. 
128 See supra Section II.B. 
129 State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429, 439–50 (Md. 2004) (discussing § 10-916 in the 
context of Battered Woman Syndrome and Battered Child Syndrome); Porter v. 
State, 166 A.3d 1044, 1059 (Md. 2017) (exploring § 10-916 in the context of self-
defense). 
130 Smullen, 844 A.2d at 445 n8. 
131 Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044, 1059 (Md. 2017); Wilson v. State, 30 A.3d 955, 
960 (Md. 2011); Dykes v. State, 571 A.2d 1251, 1256 (Md. 1990). 
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Thus, based on the law of evidence and self-defense, the court correctly 
decided to require a jury instruction on the issue of self-defense in Ms. 
Porter’s case, where at least some evidence of Battered Spouse 
Syndrome was introduced at trial.132 
 
 The Maryland Court of Appeals correctly applied Section 10-
916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article to non-
confrontational homicide, comporting with both legislative history and 
precedent.133 The Senate Floor Report on House Bill 49, as well as State 
v. Peterson and State v. Smullen acknowledged that Section 10-916 of 
the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article applies equally to 
cases of confrontational and non-confrontational homicides.134 The 
Maryland Court of Appeals, however, expanded this line of reasoning 
beyond the traditional non-confrontational homicide, where the abused 
spouse is the one who commits the homicide, to one where the abused 
spouse hires a hit man. The court argued that it did not matter how the 
defensive action was taken, rather, it is imminent fear that matters.135 It 
is evident from the Judith A. Wolfer’s letter that neither the legislature 
nor the court in Banks v. State or State v. Smullen intended Section 10-
916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article to be 
stretched so far that it would become a new defense to murder.136 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals in Porter recognized that it was 
expanding the definition of imminence, so that abuse no longer had to 
occur within hours of the homicide.137  
 
Only those who suffer from Battered Spouse Syndrome can use 
Section 10-916 to mitigate a charge of murder to manslaughter. This 
does not, however, mean that people who truly suffer from Battered 
Spouse Syndrome should be barred from using Section 10-916 of the 
Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Thus, Ms. Porter, 
                                                 
132 Porter, 166 A.3d at 1063. 
133 Id. at 1059; State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004); 
Smullen, 844 A.2d at 449. 
134 Peterson, 857 A.2d at 1136; Smullen, 844 A.2d at 449. 
135 Porter, 166 A.3d at 1061. Peterson, 857 A.2d at 1136; Smullen, 844 A.2d at 449. 
136 Letter from Judith A. Wolfer, House of Ruth, to House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 
27, 1991) (on file with the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of 
Law Thurgood Marshall Law Library); Banks v. State, 608 A.2d 1249, 1253 (Md. 
1992); Smullen, 844 A.2d at 439. 
137 Porter, 166 A.3d at 1061. 
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who demonstrated that she was a genuine sufferer of Battered Spouse 
Syndrome could use Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Article.138 Moreover, Section 10-916 of the 
Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, does not expressly 
limit the manner in which defensive action can be taken.139 The fact that 
Ms. Porter planned her method of self-defense does not automatically 
preclude an argument that she experienced “imminent fear.”140  
 
 Furthermore, Porter was correct in its decision because the court 
took into account the realities of Battered Spouse Syndrome.141 Battered 
Spouse Syndrome has been characterized in the past by a cycle of 
violence including tension building, battering, and calm phases.142 
While it has since been shown that not all women experience every 
phase in the cycle of abuse, “many battered women experience a 
psychological battering, a wearing down and wearing away of the 
spirit.”143 Battered Spouse Syndrome was also characterized by learned 
helplessness, according to Dr. Lenore Walker.144 Learned helplessness 
suggested that “women believe that they lack all control over their 
abusive situation and feel it is impossible to escape” resulting in the 
woman becoming “increasingly passive.”145  
 
The term “learned helplessness” has also been criticized in 
recent scholarship.146 The belief is now that abused women who kill 
their abusive partners do so “when they have no other alternative” 
because “they have been prevented from leaving” and it is now “kill-or-
                                                 
138 Id. at 1065. 
139 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916(b) (West 2018). 
140 Porter, 166 A.3d at 1061–62. 
141 Id. at 1062; Marina Angel, The Myth of Battered Woman Syndrome, 24 TEMP. 
POL & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 301, 303 (2015) (criticizing Walker’s theory for leaving out 
psychological and financial abuse). 
142 Walker, supra note 94, at 330. 
143 Bennett Capers, On Violence Against Women, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 347, 359 
(2016). 
144 See Walker, supra note 94, at 330 (describing learned helplessness theory as an 
“attempt[] to demonstrate how a seemingly normal functioning woman loses the 
ability to predict that what she does will have an impact upon her safety.”). 
145 Jessica Savage, Battered Woman Syndrome, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 761, 762 
(2006) (citing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 45 (1980)). 
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be-killed.”147 This new scholarship actually better supports the 
argument underlying the Battered Spouse Syndrome defense than the 
prior learned helplessness framework. For example, it is believed that a 
woman may react during a lull in the violence because she is physically 
incapable of successfully fighting back unless her partner is 
incapacitated.148 Moreover, leaving an abusive relationship is not 
always an option, as it is the most dangerous time in the relationship.149 
This helps explain why, instead of leaving, some women resort to 
violence. By allowing Ms. Porter to use the Battered Spouse Syndrome 
defense in this case, the court, although using outdated language, 
recognized that domestic violence can lead women to choose violence 
during a period of calm as a means of extricating herself from her 
abusive situation.150 
 
Moreover, the court’s decision is in line with Battered Spouse 
Syndrome and its relation to imminence.151 Battered Spouse Syndrome 
helps explain the actual imminence experienced by these women, even 
when there is no abuse occurring at the moment, as “battered women 
are more sensitive than the non-battered woman in perceiving the 
imminent danger to which they respond.”152 Evidence suggests that in 
times of stress, women are more likely to draw on social support.153 
Thus, the Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision to allow battered 
women to use Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article even when they employ hit men recognized the 
realities of domestic violence and the help-seeking that may follow 
victimization. With this psychological background in mind, it is evident 
that a woman may ask for help in dealing with her abusive situation in 
a way that would not jeopardize her safety, as leaving an abusive 
relationship is incredibly dangerous.154 Moreover, the Maryland Court 
of Appeals’ decision acknowledges the social science research 
surrounding the influence of Battered Spouse Syndrome on imminence 
and expanded the legal definition to comport with the realities of the 
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syndrome.155 Thus, the court’s decision recognizes that, in order to have 
an effective Battered Spouse Syndrome statute, it must take into account 
how the syndrome actually presents itself in real life.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In Porter v. State, the Court of Appeals held that a woman who 
had produced evidence that she suffered from Battered Spouse 
Syndrome was entitled to an imperfect self-defense jury instruction, 
even though she hired a man to kill her husband.156 The court reached 
the correct conclusion in this case because it not only recognized the 
realities of Battered Spouse Syndrome, but its decision also aligned with 
self-defense law’s low threshold for raising jury issues.157 The court 
harmonized social science research with the legislative history, 
precedent, and self-defense law of the State.158 
                                                 
155 Porter, 166 A.3d at 1059. 
156 Id. at 1061. 
157 See supra Part IV. 
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